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Abstract
This paper argues that there are notable similarities between Collingwood’s method of investigating
absolute  presuppositions  and contemporary  strands of pragmatism,  focusing on two areas  -  the
critique of realism and causation. It is first argued that there are methodological similarities between
Collingwood’s  argument  against  realism and  his  Kantian-inspired  critique  of  metaphysics,  and
Putnam’s critique of externalism. Regarding causation, it is argued that Collingwood’s view and
Price’s pragmatist  approach have a common method – investigating causation in the context of
specific human practices. Both authors place causation in the framework of scientific inquiry as
opposed to making it the subject of the inquiry itself. Thus, Collingwood’s work proves to be in line
with current metaphilosophical debates, particularly in the philosophy of science.
1. Introduction: Collingwood’s metaphilosophy
This  paper  places  Collingwood’s  philosophical  methodology  in  the  context  of  contemporary
pragmatist approaches to philosophy of science. I argue that Collingwood’s method of investigating
absolute  presuppositions  has important  similarities  to pragmatist  contributions  to two important
topics in the philosophy of science, namely the debate between realism and anti-realism, and the
problem of  causation.  In  this  section I  discuss  Collingwood’s method of investigating  absolute
presuppositions  with  focus  on  two  uses  –  his  argument  against  realism,  and  his  analysis  of
causation.  In section 2,  I  draw a broad connection  between Collingwood and pragmatism with
emphasis on recent strands of pragmatism that focus on the critique of realism and the primacy of
practice. In section 3, I argue that there are significant similarities between Collingwood’s critique
of realism alongside his  broader view on metaphysics  and Putnam’s critique of externalism.  In
section  4,  I  explore  the  similarities  between  Collingwood’s  account  of  causation  and  Price’s
pragmatist approach to causation and critique of causal realism. Section 5 investigates the extent to
which Collingwood’s work can be classified as pragmatist in the light of the comparisons to Putnam
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and Price. I conclude by placing the affinities between Collingwood’s method and pragmatism in a
broader perspective, showing how Collingwood’s strategy of investigating philosophical problems
matches  current  ways  of  approaching  issues  in  the  philosophy of  science.  Insofar  as  these  are
important approaches to issues such as causation,  or realism, Collingwood’s work proves to be
relevant to these contemporary debates.
Collingwood’s  views  on  the  issues  of  realism  and  causation  belong  to  his  broader
metaphilosophical  approach,  especially  with  respect  to  metaphysics.  In  contemporary  debates
within the philosophy of science, these topics are also subsumed under metaphysics, although the
methods of current metaphysics of science are distinct from Collingwood’s proposed account. As I
will  be  pointing  out,  although  the  discipline  is  structured  differently,  there  are  significant
similarities  to  Collingwood’s  method  when  investigating  pragmatist  approaches  to  realism and
causation. 
Regarding  methodology,  a  notable  claim  from  Collingwood’s  Essay  on  Philosophical
Method (EPM) holds that philosophy ‘does not, like exact or empirical science, bring us to know
things of which we were simply ignorant, but brings us to know in a different way things which we
already knew in some way’ (Collingwood 2005: 161). This passage presents the goal of philosophy
as uncovering hidden assumptions, and thus bringing previous knowledge into a different light. I
take  Collingwood’s  considerations  on  metaphysics  to  fall  within  this  broader  scope  of  his
philosophy. While it is subject to debate whether Collingwood changed views between EPM and
Essay on Metaphysics (EM), I follow interpretations that establish continuity between the two.1 
Concerning metaphysics,  in the beginning of EM, Collingwood rejects  the definition of
metaphysics  as  a  science  of  pure being and proposes  a  view on metaphysics  as  ‘a  science  of
absolute presuppositions’ (Collingwood 2002: 41). Collingwood describes propositions as answers
to questions; propositions can be propounded, and they can be true or false (23-25). Collingwood
further holds that ‘every question involves a presupposition’ (25). One of the defining features of
presuppositions  is  that  they  do not  need to  be true  in order  to  function (28).  In distinguishing
between relative and absolute presuppositions, Collingwood holds that absolute presuppositions are
not propositions, since they do not have a truth value (32). Absolute presuppositions constitute the
subject of metaphysics: ‘the scientist’s business is not to propound them, but only to presuppose
them. The metaphysician’s business [...] is not to propound them, but to propound the proposition
that  this  or  that  one  of  them  is  presupposed  (33).  While  there  are  several  aspects  of  interest
concerning Collingwood’s  proposed reform of metaphysics,  for my purposes here,  the issue of
heuristics  and  modes  of  inquiry  is  central.  As  D’Oro  and  Connelly  state,  ‘what  makes  the
1  See Martin 2002: liii-liv and the introduction by Dharamsi et al. in the current volume. 
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presupposition absolute is that it cannot be forsaken without at the same time undermining the form
of  enquiry  which  it  makes  possible’  (2015:  3.2).  Martin  also  emphasizes  the  role  of  absolute
presuppositions  in  understanding:  ‘absolute  presuppositions  constitute  the  nature  of  our
understanding within a particular universe of discourse and they govern the inquiry we undertake
and the explanations we give there in individual cases’ (Martin 2002: xxvi-xxvii). This overall view
on Collingwood’s method and his considerations on the status of metaphysics enables a closer look
at the topics stated above: realism and causation. 
Concerning realism, Collingwood’s proposed reform of metaphysics, involves the denial of
presuppositionless  knowledge. As pointed out by D’Oro: ‘Collingwood’s claim to be practising
metaphysics without ontology [...] should be read as putting forward the rather strong claim that
there can be no presuppositionless inquiry into reality rather than as stating the rather weaker claim
that descriptive metaphysicians should limit themselves to an examination of our ways of thinking
and speaking about the world’  (2003:  22-23).  As a  continuation  of this  project,  Collingwood’s
denial of realism is not what could be labelled as an ontological claim, but rather an epistemological
one: ‘the “realism” which constitutes the target of Collingwood's critique is not the ontological
thesis that there exist mind independent objects, but the epistemological thesis that there is such a
thing as presuppositionless knowledge of reality (D’Oro and Connelly 2015: 3.2). Collingwood’s
rejection of realism is explicit in An Autobiography (2013: 44-45): 
For  if  you  know  that  no  difference  is  made  to  a  thing  θ  by  the
presence or absence of a certain condition c, you know what θ is like
with c, and also what θ is like without c, and on comparing the two
find no difference. This involves knowing what θ is like without c; in
the present case, knowing what you defined as the unknown.
In relation to presuppositionless knowledge, the argument can be reconstructed as stating that to
claim that the world is independent from one’s knowledge, one should have access to the world as
one knows it, but also to the world independent from one’s knowledge (D’Oro 2003: 42-43). By
this, Collingwood rejects realism on the ground that it requires knowledge of things in themselves.
The rejection of realism brings forth a comparison to pragmatism. D’Oro, for instance, emphasizes
the  link  to  pragmatism with  respect  to  rejecting  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth.  However,
despite his criticism of the correspondence theory of truth, unlike pragmatists, Collingwood does
not seek to dissolve traditional metaphysical questions, but instead tries to provide a new way of
investigating  them.  Also,  unlike  pragmatists,  Collingwood  does  not  abandon  the  normative
character  of  philosophy  (D’Oro 2003:  47).  While  D’Oro’s  discussion  mainly  refers  to  Rorty’s
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version of pragmatism,2 in section 4 I  will  assess Collingwood’s stance on the debate  between
realism and anti-realism, as well as his relation to different strands of pragmatism. 
Regarding  causation,  Collingwood  uses  his  method  of  investigating  absolute
presuppositions  to  identify  the  presupposition  underlying  causal  thought.3 According  to
Collingwood,  this  presupposition  relies  on the ability  to  distinguish between a present  state  of
affairs which an agent aims to change into an intended state of affairs, ‘the  causa quod […] is a
situation or state of things believed by the agent in question to exist’ and ‘the causa ut is a purpose
or  state  of  things  to  be  brought  about’  (Collingwood  2002:  292).  This  is  also  reflected  in
Collingwood’s  causation  in  sense I:  ‘that  which is  “caused” is  the free and deliberate  act  of a
conscious and responsible agent, and “causing” him to do it means affording him a motive for doing
it’ (285). Collingwood deems sense I logically prior to the other two, that is, acting to bring about a
certain effect - sense II, or causal interactions between events in nature - sense III (292, 323). This
is in line with his earlier claim that absolute presuppositions are logically prior to questions (21),
that is, to investigate what caused an event, one presupposes a relation between two events akin to
that between an agent and the pursuit of a goal to hold. Notable for the metaphilosophical focus of
this paper, investigating causation through the absolute presuppositions underlying causal thought
keeps the direction from epistemology to metaphysics:  the meaning causation is presupposed to
hold connects to the methods of inquiry. I explore this further in section 5.
2. Collingwood and Pragmatism
Having sketched Collingwood’s considerations on metaphysics, I will now explore the connection
to pragmatism. My focus here will rest on more recent versions, as opposed classical pragmatism.
This  is  firstly  to  emphasize  the  relevance  of  Collingwood’s  work  for  current  developments  of
pragmatism  and  philosophy  of  science.  Secondly,  since  there  are  several  features  specific  to
pragmatist  thought,  distinguishable  in  the  work  of  contemporary  authors  associated  with
pragmatism, particular characteristics can be broken down for mapping out Collingwood’s view.
Particularly, I take features within Putnam’s and Price’s philosophy to match Collingwood’s views
more closely given the following broad shared characteristics:  the denial  of the correspondence
theory of  truth,  the denial  of  distinctions  such as  appearance-reality  or  thought-experience,  the
denial of ‘pure being’ as the subject of philosophy and the focus on practices of inquiry. I will
elaborate on particular issues regarding realism and causation in sections 4 and 5. For the purposes
2  See Rorty (1982, 1991).
3  EM, Chapter IIIc and “On the So-called Idea of Causation”.
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of the current section,  I will also point out the links to classic pragmatist  thought to provide a
cohesive picture of pragmatism and its history, given the difficulty of finding a unifying definition.
In a narrow sense, pragmatism can be defined through the pragmatist maxim, traced to the
classic  pragmatist  philosophers,  Peirce,  James,  and  Dewey:  ‘a  distinctive  rule  or  method  for
becoming reflectively clear about the contents of concepts and hypotheses: we clarify a hypothesis
by  identifying  its  practical  consequences’  (Hookway  2016:  2).  This  maxim  is  not  universally
accepted  among  later  philosophers  associated  with  pragmatism,  thus,  a  definition  capturing  a
broader sense, would associate pragmatism with particular stances on classic philosophical topics
and debates.  For  instance,  Putnam singles  out  the  following  characteristics  of  pragmatism:  (1)
antiscepticism; (2) fallibilism; (3) rejecting the fundamental dichotomy between facts and values;
(4)  the  primacy  of  practice  (Putnam  1994:  152).  In  Hookway’s  reconstruction,  several  other
dichotomies are involved beside facts and values, such as mind-body, thought-experience, analytic-
synthetic  (Hookway  2016:  5).  Though  Collingwood  can  be  said  to  share  with  the  classical
understanding of pragmatism the focus on method, as well as the aim of conceptual clarification, he
does not focus directly on consequences. Rather, a certain concept, or hypothesis is examined in the
context of the absolute presuppositions underlying the process of inquiry where the given concepts
or hypotheses belong. Note that this does connect to the usage of concepts, and specific epistemic
practices, but unlike a view focusing on consequences, Collingwood aims to disclose the absolute
presuppositions at work within the given practice. 
Earlier  pragmatist  approaches to truth enabled later views such as Rorty’s deflationism,
which, as noted by D’Oro (2003), stands in contrast with Collingwood’s philosophy. Notably, Rorty
adopted a deflationist view on the majority of the traditional problems of philosophy, such as the
debate  between  realism  and  anti-realism.  While  Collingwood  also  criticized  truth  as
correspondence, he did not support anything akin to the pragmatist theory of truth. Thus, given its
focus on critiquing traditional philosophical debates and distinctions, Rorty’s strand of pragmatism
appears  to  be  taking  the  critique  of  metaphysics  farther  than  Collingwood.  Furthermore,
Collingwood proposed the reform of metaphysics through an epistemological project, while Rorty
proclaimed ‘the death of epistemology’. In the light of these differences, I argue that Collingwood’s
views are much closer to pragmatist  approaches with different focus, such as Putnam’s. Firstly,
Putnam also  rejects  the  pragmatist  theory  of  truth  (and the  label  of  ‘pragmatism’  altogether).4
Secondly,  Collingwood’s  argument  against  realism  fits  the  project  of  denying  the  dichotomy
between appearance and reality. As I will argue in the next section, there are important similarities
between Collingwood’s  case against  realism,  and Putnam’s  ‘internal  realism’.  A final  common
4  See Rorty, Putnam, Conant, and Helfrich (2004).
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point between Collingwood and pragmatist thought for my purposes here is the denial of an a priori
metaphysics.  I  should note a connection with Peirce’s considerations  on the pragmatist  maxim,
understood as  ‘a  logical  rule  that  shows the  emptiness  of  “concepts”  which  have  no  practical
consequences’  (Hookway  2016:  6),  and  thus  reveal  connections  to  classical  pragmatism.
Metaphysics is not concerned with a priori truths about ‘pure being’ for Collingwood either, but
rather with absolute presuppositions, which are investigated in their historical contexts. The claim
that certain philosophical  problems can be addressed only by investigating human practices  (as
opposed to a study of ‘pure being’) is currently adopted by philosophers taking a pragmatist stance,
such as Price, Brandom, and Kitcher. In section 5, I will further explore the connection to Price,
given the discussion of the common topic of causation.
These broad similarities between Collingwood’s work and contemporary contributions to
pragmatist  thought,  particularly  by  Putnam  and  Price  will  provide  the  framework  for  a  more
detailed  investigation  of  pragmatist  approaches  to the issues  of  realism and causation.  As both
issues have been important topics in 20th century philosophy of science, the analysis will stress the
importance of Collingwood’s work within this field.
3. Collingwood and Putnam on realism and anti-realism
In this subsection, I emphasize the similarities between Collingwood’s and Putnam’s considerations
on realism. I focus on the distinction between metaphysical realism and internal realism, as well as
on the role of Kant’s philosophy as an earlier statement of the views above, and further on a broader
metaphilosophical  statement  concerning the role of metaphysical  inquiry.  I  argue that  there are
important  similarities  regarding Collingwood’s  and Putnam’s  methods  of  investigating  realism,
while the broader aims and philosophical views they endorse are distinct.
Putnam describes metaphysical realism, or externalism, as a view holding that the world is
constituted by mind independent objects (Putnam 1981: 49). According to externalism, it is possible
to provide a complete description of the world as it is, from a perspective that Putnam deems ‘God’s
Eye point of view’. Putnam contrasts this view with internalism, defined as holding that multiple
descriptions  of  the  world  are  possible  from different  perspectives  ‘of  actual  persons  reflecting
various interests  and purposes that their  descriptions  and theories subserve’,  and associates  this
view with pragmatism (50).  According to  Putnam, externalism,  despite  being among the oldest
views in philosophy, is untenable; he goes on to defend internalism, whose origins he traces back to
Kant.
There are important similarities between Putnam’s and Collingwood’s views on realism,
but there are also points of contrast. Both philosophers rejected the possibility of knowing the world
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from God’s Eye viewpoint.  The plurality  of actual  viewpoints sketched by Putnam in terms of
interests and purposes can also be explained in terms of absolute presuppositions. According to
Collingwood’s view, absolute presuppositions underlie scientific theories without being part of the
theories themselves, or subject to evaluation with respect to truth value. The further step in bringing
these similarities together is to hold that absolute presuppositions express interests and purposes
specific to a given historical context of inquiry, which are not questioned among those conducting
the inquiry, but subject to philosophical analysis. 
Given  these  similarities,  two important  divergences  should  be  noted.  Firstly,  Putnam’s
description of realism starts off from an ontological perspective, the existence of mind-independent
objects,  and  only  later  explores  its  epistemological  consequences,  i.e.,  a  version  of  the
correspondence  theory  of  truth.  As  explained  above,  Collingwood’s  argument  against  realism
renders attempts to describe the world in terms of mind-independent objects impossible from the
onset  as  such  endeavour  would  assume  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves.  Unlike  Putnam’s
ontological claims, Collingwood’s argument against realism relies on an epistemological thesis –
that  it  is  implossible  to  know  the  world  in  itself.  Secondly,  while  there  are  epistemological
arguments  on  both sides,  it  should  be noted  that  sceptical  scenarios  play  an  important  role  in
Putnam’s defence of internal realism. Namely, Putnam explains that the Brain in a Vat scenario can
be readily dismissed by the internalist: in a world where there are brains in vats, one can observe
whether other people are brains in vats, but envisioning a world where everyone is a brain in a vat
would require God’s Eye view (50). This line of defence is not available to the externalist, who
would require a justification independent of the individual observer’s perspective. As the discussion
above shows, this is a refutation of a global sceptical scenario. While scepticism was among the
widely discussed topics during Collingwood’s time, he did not focus on refuting scepticism (D’Oro
2003: 30). On Collingwood’s view, realism does not hold because it rests on an assumption of
presuppositionless knowledge, and the ability of answering sceptical arguments is not a decisive
point for favouring one view over another.
A different  kind  of  similarity  stems  from the  influence  of  Kant’s  philosophy  on  both
thinkers.  Putnam identifies  Kant  as  the  first  representative  of  internalism,  and further  explores
several  Kantian  themes  in  his  works  (Putnam 1981:  74).  While  Putnam openly  acknowledges
Kant’s  view as  crucially  important  to  his  approach,  the  connection  between  Collingwood  and
Kantian philosophy is subject to debate (D’Oro and Connelly 2015: 5.3). For my purposes here I
rely  on  certain  important  Kantian  themes  in  Collingwood’s  work  identified  D’Oro:  both
philosophers’ proposals for reforming metaphysics, their acknowledgement of a distinction between
ontological  and  epistemological  dimensions  of  idealism,  and  philosophical  method  –  namely
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explaining our experience in EM, or its conditions of possibility in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
(D’Oro 2003: 25-28). These similarities show important convergences between the views of the two
philosophers.
Comparing  how  Kant’s  philosophy  influenced  Collingwood  and  Putnam,  the  most
important themes to stress are realism and the reform of metaphysics. I take the following claim by
Putnam to be relevant: ‘if we do shift our way of thinking to the extent of regarding “the world” as
partly constituted by the representing mind, then many things in our popular philosophy (...) must
be reexamined. (…) Kant held that (...) this philosophical question was never going to be solved by
empirical science. I am suggesting that on this subject Kant was right’ (Putnam 1992: 162). This
passage showing Putnam’s opposition to realism, is remarkably similar to Collingwood’s argument:
the  world  being  partly  constituted  by  the  mind  entails  that  there  is  no  mind-independent,  i.e.,
presuppositionless knowledge. Furthermore, convergence on the wider metaphilosophical stances of
the two philosophers and Kant is revealed: the debate between realism and anti-realism cannot be
solved by the means of science, and belongs to the realm of metaphysics. This falls in line with
Collingwood’s  claim  that  absolute  presuppositions  fall  within  the  area  of  metaphysical
investigation, and are different from empirical claims, for instance, by not having a truth value.
The  considerations  above  provide  an  insight  into  the  pragmatist  topics  within
Collingwood’s and Putnam’s work. Directing the investigation towards philosophy of science, there
is a question concerning realism as a matter of degree. While both Collingwood and Putnam deny a
particular strand of realism that has dominated philosophy for centuries, so far I did not clarify the
extent to which they reject realist assumptions. To answer this question, I rely on the view that
commitments to realism come in degree, as contemporary discussions on objectivity and scientific
realism have shown.5 Putnam criticized externalism and the correspondence theory of truth, while at
the same time supporting a  different  branch of realism,  concerning theoretical  entities  (such as
electrons). One of his well-known statements is that: ‘realism is the only philosophy that doesn't
make the success of the science a miracle’ (Putnam, 1975: 73). While Putnam is a critic of realism,
he does not entirely dispense with realist tenets, particularly regarding theoretical entities in the
sciences.  Thus,  if  we  view  the  philosophical  stances  between  realism  and  anti-realism  as  a
spectrum, Putnam’s overall view would be closer to realism than Collingwood’s. As Collingwood
was not  particularly  concerned with theoretical  entities,  it  would  be difficult  to  reconstruct  his
stance on this issue for comparison with Putnam’s view. A preliminary conclusion of the discussion
above is that Collingwood and Putnam use comparable strategies in attacking realism, and trace
5  See Douglas (2004) for objectivity, and Chakravartty 2017 for scientific realism.
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their  stance  regarding  metaphysics  to  similar  historical  sources.  Nevertheless,  their  ultimate
conclusions are different.
To sum up, Collingwood’s work has similarities to Putnam’s stance on pragmatism, namely
involvement in the debates over realism and anti-realism and particularly the critique of realism.
While their contributions reflect rejections of particular dichotomies, notably between primary and
secondary  qualities,  and  appearance  and  reality,  neither  philosopher  pursued  dissolving
philosophical problems as other strands of pragmatism proposed. Broadly, this fits the project of
reforming  metaphysics,  or,  more  narrowly,  the  metaphysical  debates  over  realism,  and  both
philosophers converge on the view that the investigation of these issues is not empirical.  While
there are differences in their engagement with ontology, the problem of skepticism, and to what
degree the two philosophers are realist, there are methodological similarities and shared historical
influences.  I  take  these  similarities  to  be  important  especially  given  the  metaphilosophical
dimension  of  Collingwood’s  work  and  of  pragmatism:  the  strategy  he  employed  is  largely
compatible  with  Putnam’s  pragmatist  approach.  However,  in  the  next  section  I  show  how
Collingwood’s  treatment  of  causation  brings  his  view  closer  to  Price’s  pragmatism  than  to
Putnam’s.
4. Collingwood and Price on investigating causal concepts through human practices
In  the  context  of  Collingwood’s  philosophy,  the  analysis  of  causation  is  an  illustration  of  his
method of investigating absolute presuppositions. The connection between causation and realism,
examined  in  the  previous  section,  should  also  be  noted:  Price,  whose  views  I  compare  to
Collingwood’s, favours a projectivist view over realism: causation is said to be a secondary quality,
tied to specific human capacities.6 Price (2001) presents this view in a pragmatist  key and also
points  to a  connection  with Putnam’s  denial  of  the distinction  between primary  and secondary
qualities, which is part of Putnam’s broader critique of externalism described above. The difference
to stress, however, is that Collingwood’s discussion of the three senses of causation targets three
types of causal explanation, and thus there is no ontological commitment regarding causation. As I
will explain below, while Price discusses a version of ontological subjectivity, which would run
against causal realism, he focuses on a practice-driven sense. Thus, insofar as neither Collingwood,
nor Price, commit themselves to realism, the similarity between their overall views appears to be
stronger than in Putnam’s case. In this section, I explore specific similarities regarding causation.
6  See Price (1991); Menzies and Price (1993) and Price (2007).
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Price draws several distinctions with respect to subjectivity about causation, one of which
refers  to  ontology,  but  focuses  on  one  aspect:  the  practice-subjectivity  of  causation.  He
acknowledges this as a pragmatist stance: ‘the practice-subjective doctrine that we don’t understand
the notion of causation—as philosophers, as it were—until we understand its origins in the lives and
practice  of  agents  such  as  ourselves’  (Price  2001:  107).  He  traces  this  strategy  of  analysing
causation to Ramsey’s (1978) considerations on probability, which, in Price’s interpretation, cannot
be characterized without  its  role  in decision-making,  which is  a human endeavour (Price 2001:
107). Price distinguishes between global pragmatism and pragmatism about causation on the basis
of a divergence between the realist doctrine about theoretical entities and causal realism. Briefly, his
view goes as follows: ‘being realist about causation is not like being realist about electrons, or any
of the other postulates of the special  sciences.  Causation is different,  and it  is pragmatism, not
realism,  which  offers  an  account  of  the  difference’  (120).  How  does  pragmatism  explain  the
difference?  According  to  Price,  the  role  of  causation  in  the  sciences  is  different  from that  of
theoretical entities: ‘causation is the medium in which the investigation is conducted, the thread
which leads to unseen objects. Treat the thread itself as unknown, and we are simply blind’ (114).
Since the details of Price’s argument go beyond the purpose of my paper, I will comment on his
overarching view.7
There are several analogies to draw between Price’s project and Collingwood’s approach.
Firstly, the subjective component of causation under Price’s view, namely the agent’s situation, is
consistent  with  Collingwood’s  formulation  of  the  absolute  presupposition  underlying  causal
thought, i.e., a reason prompting a particular action. The more general presupposition rests on an
explanation scheme involving  causa quod  (efficient cause) and  causa ut  (final cause) which  are
present in Collingwood’s explanation of sense I causation – performing an action in pursuit of a
goal. As specified in section 1, according to Collingwood, this sense is prior to the other two senses
– the causal connection between an action and its effect (sense II), or between events in nature
(sense III). Thus, on Collingwood’s view, notably, causal explanation in history is rendered possible
by the presupposition that agents perceive the distinction between a current and a desired state of
affairs  and  act  to  bring  about  the  latter.8 While  causal  explanation  in  history  is  central  to
Collingwood’s work, the model can be extended to a broader claim that absolute presuppositions
render specific forms of inquiry possible (as illustrated by causal explanations reliant on senses II
and III). These tenets by Collingwood can be represented as standing in logical connection with
7  Briefly put, Price argues that while the existence of theoretical entities is proved by their
causal interactions, the same move would not hold for causation, since that would be circular.
8  This interpretation would bring together EM and The Idea of History.
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Price’s claim that causation is only understood by investigating the agent’s practices, particularly
decision-making. To clarify how Price’s claim can be a consequence of Collingwood’s global view:
1. Absolute  presuppositions  enable  means  of  inquiry  specific  to  particular  sciences
(Collingwood’s definition of absolute presuppositions).
2. Absolute presuppositions are the object of study of philosophy (Collingwood’s EM, EPM).
3. The absolute  presupposition  enabling  causal  thought  consists  of  a  distinction  between a
current and a desired state of affairs and the ability to act to enact the latter – the relation
between causa quod and causa ut (Collingwood on causation).
4. The ability to act such as to turn a current state of affairs into a desired one (the relation
between  causa quod and  causa ut) is  characteristic  of human agents and tied to human
practices.
5. Therefore, a philosophical analysis of causal concepts in the context of scientific inquiry can
only  be  conducted  by  investigating  human  agents’  practices  (Price’s  pragmatism  about
causation).
If this is correct, Price’s view may be logically connected to an overall view on the presuppositions
underlying  causal  thought  of  the  kind  Collingwood supports.  To put  it  another  way,  questions
concerning causation are enabled by a stance that takes into consideration an agent’s actions and
perspective.  As  specified  above,  while  Collingwood’s  analysis  connecting  motives  to  actions
mainly applies to history, causal thought is modelled on human practices in the case of other special
sciences  too,  as  Price’s  considerations  on  decision-making  show.  Further  in-depth  similarities
between Collingwood’s view and Price’s perspectivalism are explored elsewhere.9 While this point
shows Collingwood’s work to be relevant to contemporary debates on causation and agency, the
connection to pragmatism will be more thoroughly established in what follows. 
The other important point to make in this section is that the distinction between first order
entities in science and causation as a medium for the investigation made by Price in a pragmatist
context  can  also  be  drawn using  Collingwood’s  method.  The  project  of  investigating  absolute
presuppositions  rests  on  a  distinction  between  scientific  knowledge  and  the  presuppositions
enabling the inquiry. On this view, causal connections are not akin to the entities scientists posit,
but,  rather,  belong  to  the  category  of  absolute  presuppositions  rendering  the  whole  process  of
inquiry  possible.  To  investigate  the  causal  powers  of  electrons  is  to  assume  that  looking  for
properties which enable an entity to cause certain events is a valid way of conducting research. For
comparison, I refer to Collingwood’s example concerning the absolute presupposition that events
are caused:
9  See Popa (2016), section 4.
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[I]f  you were  talking  to  a  pathologist  about  a  certain  disease  and
asked him ‘What is the cause of event E which you say sometimes
happens in this disease?’ he will reply ‘The cause of E is C’; and if he
were in  a  communicative  mood he might  go on to  say ‘That  was
established by So-and-so, in a piece of research that is now regarded
as classical.’  You might go on to ask ‘I suppose before So-and-so
found out what the cause of E was, he was quite sure it had a cause?’.
The answer would be ‘Quite sure, of course.’ If you now ask ‘Why?’
he will probably reply ‘Because everything that happens has a cause.’
If you are importunate enough to ask ‘But how do you know that
everything that happens has a cause?’ he will probably blow up right
in your face, because you have put your finger on one of his absolute
presuppositions,  and people  are  apt  to  be ticklish  in  their  absolute
presuppositions. But if he keeps his temper and gives you a civil and
candid answer it will be to the following effect. ‘That is a thing we
take for granted in  my job.  We don’t question it.  We don’t  try  to
verify it. It isn’t a thing anybody has discovered, like microbes or the
circulation  of  the  blood.  It  is  a  thing  we  just  take  for  granted’
(Collingwood 2002: 31).
As this passage shows, the role of causation is not to be sought among the first order entities used in
research  on  pathology.  Rather,  causation  is  part  of  the  absolute  presuppositions  enabling  the
inquiry. This point is in line with Price’s pragmatism regarding stipulating a different status for
causation in comparison to first order entities in the sciences. While no claims about what microbes
bring about what disease can be made without a concept of causation, causation itself cannot be
investigated  by  the  methods  of  pathology.  Moreover,  Collingwood  also  mentions  that  this
presupposition  no  longer  holds  in  every  area  of  science,  which  is  also  in  line  with  Price’s
considerations  on  causation  in  the  special  sciences,  and  with  further  contemporary  debates  on
whether there is causation in fundamental physics.10 It should be noted that this investigation can be
extended  to  Price’s  overall  pragmatist  view  involving  ‘practical  stances’,  causation  being  one
instance among examples  such as probabilities  and conditionals (Price 2013: 47-48). Insofar as
absolute presuppositions underlie various forms of inquiry, causal thought alongside other means of
investigation enable various scientific fields without being part of the content of the said sciences.11
10  See, for instance, Field (2003).
11  An analogy can be drawn here to D’Oro’s comparison between Collingwood’s critique of
metaphysics and Carnap’s considerations on the internal/external distinction. Carnap criticizes metaphysics for aiming
at answering external questions while questions in general can only be answered within a frame. Collingwood’s view
supports this distinction, but shifts the object of metaphysics to the frame itself (D’Oro 2015).
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In  the  light  of  the  point  above,  the  affinity  between  Collingwood’s  view  on  causal
explanation and Price’s pragmatism can be further emphasized. Both authors distinguish between
first order claims of specific sciences and the frame of inquiry, and on both views causal concepts
can be fully analysed only by reference to the human practices constituting the frame. Thus, when
causal concepts are used in explanations in the special sciences, they inevitably reflect aspects  of
the human subject. This point is emphasized by Price when discussing Putnam’s interpretation of
Kant  and instrumentalism – causal  explanations  are  significant  from the  perspective  of  human
concerns  rather  than  by reference  to  a  mind-independent  reality.  Thus,  Collingwood and Price
converge  on  a  view  on  causation  as  fundamentally  connected  to  human  practices  and  causal
explanation is always set against a corresponding frame of inquiry. Price (2001: 108) holds that if
there were no thinking beings there would be no causal concepts, and, by extension, no search for
causal explanations.
In summary, there are notable affinities between Collingwood’s method of investigating
absolute  presuppositions  together  with  his  specific  view on  causation  and  Price’s  pragmatism.
Firstly, understanding causation through an absolute presupposition that refers to a human capacity
(acting  in  pursuit  of  goals)  entails  a  view  on  causal  understanding  along  the  lines  of  Price’s
practice-subjectivity – i.e., we can understand causation only by looking into its origins in particular
human  practices.  Secondly,  the  role  of  causation  in  scientific  inquiry  is  similar  within
Collingwood’s method of investigating absolute presuppositions and Price’s pragmatist framework:
causation is  not part  of the set  of entities  scientists  postulate,  but part  of the broader frame of
inquiry, which enables research in a given field. The resulting causal explanations are dependent on
the corresponding frame on both views.
5. Collingwood’s pragmatism
Having  mapped  out  different  strands  of  pragmatism  and  highlighted  similarities  between
Collingwood’s thought and contributions to pragmatism by Putnam and Price, I will end by placing
Collingwood’s  view  among  the  aspects  of  pragmatism  discussed  so  far.  This  will  enable  an
assessment of the extent to which Collingwood’s philosophy can be classified as pragmatist. In the
light of the discussion above, this section holds that Collingwood’s view is closer to Price’s with
regard to the considerations on a frame of inquiry and causal explanation. At the same time, there
are notable affinities between Collingwood’s views and Putnam’s contributions to pragmatism with
regard to ways of contesting metaphysical realism and traditional philosophical dichotomies which
are also present in Price’s pragmatism.
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Broadly,  Collingwood’s  critique  of  realism  and  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  is
consistent  with  the  multiple  strands  of  pragmatism  explored  here.  Nevertheless,  the  proposed
reform of metaphysics sets Collingwood apart from a pragmatist theory of truth and the denial of
traditional philosophical debates as in Rorty’s pragmatism, while his reliance on epistemology as
opposed  to  ontology  excludes  views  such  as  Putnam’s  internal  realism.  In  terms  of  placing
Collingwood’s view on a spectrum between realism and anti-realism, in the light of the present
analysis,  Price’s  pragmatism about  causation appears to be the closest.  The analysis   of causal
concepts  in  the  context  of  human  practices  parallels  Collingwood’s  statement  of  the  absolute
presupposition underlying causal thought, and placing causation within the frame as opposed to the
content of inquiry. A further common point emerges when considering the connection between the
frame of inquiry and causal explanations: causal explanations and uses of causal concepts generally
are dependent on the frame as opposed to referring exclusively to mind-independent entities. In
Collingwood’s case this frame is constituted by absolute presuppositions, while Price distinguishes
between the investigation itself and its medium with causation belonging to the latter. Nevertheless,
the views converge  as far  as  pragmatism about  causal  concepts  and the rejection  of  realism is
concerned.  A  question  arising  here  is  whether  Collingwood’s  considerations  on  absolute
presuppositions may be closer to a kind of global pragmatism as opposed to Price’s pragmatism
about  causation.  Noting  that  an  answer  to  this  question  would  require  further  investigation  of
certain claims belonging to scientific realism that Price refers to, such as entity realism, I restrict my
comparison to a broad feature of pragmatism – the reference to human practices – and the resulting
view on philosophical concepts such as causation. As causation was one particular illustration of
Collingwood’s  method  of  investigating  absolute  presuppositions,  pragmatist  analyses  of  further
concepts are possible, without necessarily committing to global pragmatism.
Having  noted  the  pragmatist  treatment  of  causation  in  the  case  of  both  Price  and
Collingwood,  alongside the critique  of  realism,  one final  point  to  note is  that  much of Price’s
discussion relies on Putnam’s contributions to pragmatism, particularly concerning the denial of
philosophical  dichotomies  and  contributions  regarding  instrumentalism.  Thus,  despite  the
divergences  concerning  realism  and  ontology,  the  methodological  similarities  between
Collingwood’s  investigation  of  absolute  presuppositions  and  Putnam’s  and  Price’s  pragmatism
should  be  emphasized.  The  denial  of  ‘God’s  eye’  perspective  on  metaphysics,  and
presuppositionless  knowledge  enabled  similar  critical  stances  towards  dichotomies  such  as
appearance  and  reality,  or  primary  and  secondary  qualities,  and  thus  a  pragmatist  outlook  on
philosophy.
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Thus,  the  connections  between  Collingwood’s  views  and  the  strands  of  pragmatism
discussed here are twofold. Firstly, in terms of distinguishing between a frame of inquiry and first
order scientific knowledge and articulating a pragmatist view on causal concepts with the potential
of providing similar analyses to other concepts, Collingwood’s view is closer to Price’s. Secondly, a
focus  on  methodology  reveals  similarities  to  Putnam’s  critique  of  metaphysical  realism,  and a
pragmatist viewpoint on important philosophical debates, with the notable exceptions of scepticism
and  ontological  inquiry.  This  shows  a  complex  picture  of  affinities  along  different  aspects  of
Collingwood’s work and different strands of pragmatism.
6. Conclusion: Collingwood and pragmatist approaches to realism and causation
This  paper  has  explored  similarities  between  Collingwood’s  overall  method  of  investigating
presuppositions applied to the issues of realism and causation, and current strands of pragmatism by
Putnam and Price. Analysing Collingwood’s critique of realism in comparison to Putnam’s, I noted
that both philosophers denied certain traditional philosophical dichotomies (thought vs. experience,
primary vs. secondary qualities,  appearance vs. reality  etc.),  while being participants in debates
concerning  others  (realism  vs.  anti-realism).  From  a  methodological  point  of  view,  both
philosophers took the problem of realism to be the subject of philosophy, as opposed to empirical
science. This points to deep methodological similarities between the two thinkers, and emphasizes
the compatibility between Collingwood’s approach and the pragmatist strategy. This point is further
strengthened by the divergences between Putnam and Collingwood concerning arguments against
realism  and  Putnam’s  focus  on  scepticism,  and  the  ultimately  different  conclusions  regarding
realism – Putnam’s critique is meant to support a different kind of realism, while Collingwood’s
critique is meant to establish that the claim that the world is independent of the subject’s knowledge
cannot hold, given the impossibility of presuppositionless knowledge. While the two philosophers
pursued different aims, the methods they employed led them to views marked by some of the main
tenets of pragmatism. 
The  investigation  of  Price’s  pragmatist  stance  on  causation  and  Collingwood’s
considerations  on  the  absolute  presupposition  underlying  causal  thought  has  shown similarities
regarding both methodology, as well as concerning the view on the role of causation in scientific
inquiry. On both authors’ accounts, causation is to be investigated in the context of specific human
practices from which causal thought arises, particularly in connection to agency. Likewise, on both
views there is a distinction between the main tenets of science and the tenets and concepts that
shape the process of inquiry, and causation is part of the latter. I take this final point to be the main
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point of convergence between Collingwood and the pragmatist views explored here: current debates
in the philosophy of science have involved distinctions between first order entities and a certain
frame, or set of conditions for the inquiry. As pointed out above, a similar strategy was employed
by Collingwood in his suggestion of reforming metaphysics.  The subsequent debates within the
philosophy of  science,  especially  those pertaining  to  pragmatism,  emphasize  the  importance  of
drawing the distinction in the first place, and the need for further research on methodology: how do
specific methods and practices affect our understanding of concepts used in the sciences? In this
respect  Collingwood’s  work on causation  deserves  further  emphasis,  both through its  focus  on
action, which is gaining wide acceptability in current debates, as well as through the epistemically
driven method: one can find out what causation is by studying one’s means of investigating causal
connections.
From the  broader  perspective  of  contemporary  debates  on  metaphilosophy,  the  current
paper has shown that Collingwood’s method is comparable to particular pragmatist  approaches:
Putnam’s critique of metaphysics, and Price’s considerations on causation, a frame of inquiry, and
human concerns. While Collingwood does not subscribe to a fully deflationist view, his proposed
reform of metaphysics does away with certain traditional distinctions and assumptions. In the light
of the argument here, Collingwood’s view can be said to have anticipated metaphysical debates
concerning scientific concepts and practices of inquiry, and to have provided a method that can be
used in addressing some of these issues.
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